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TAGS: [MARR](#) [PREL](#) [SU](#) [KPKO](#)
SUBJECT: DPKO URGES PRESSURE ON BASHIR, KONARE TO ASSURE
ASSISTANCE TO AMIS

REF: A. SECSTATE 08615

[1](#)B. 01/25/2007 BRUNO-DEPARTMENT EMAIL
[1](#)C. 01/25/2007 MURRAY-DEPARTMENT EMAIL

Classified By: Ambassador Jackie W. Sanders for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

[1](#)1. (C) SUMMARY. USUN Ambassador Sanders delivered ref A points to United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Assistant Secretary-General (A/SYG) Hedi Annabi on January 25, stressing our interest in helping DPKO to identify and deploy as early as possible any and all elements of the heavy support package (HSP) to assist the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Annabi confirmed that letters from the SYG and African Union (AU) Commission Chair Konare endorsing the HSP were transmitted to Sudanese President Bashir January 25 (ref B). Annabi urged international pressure on Bashir to respond positively to the HSP. Lamenting the AU's (in particular Konare's) obstructionist stance during HSP negotiations, Annabi said that HSP deployment would realistically take months, not weeks, despite its being an "absolute priority" for the UN. He recommended intense international community engagement with Konare as a concrete way of expediting the deployment process. Regarding hybrid force negotiations, several issues remain outstanding, and DPKO was not optimistic that the draft framework would be adopted at the AU Summit on January 29-30. END SUMMARY.

[1](#)2. (C) USUN Ambassador Sanders delivered ref A points to UN DPKO A/SYG Annabi on January 25; Under-SYG Guehenno was in Addis Ababa with the SYG for the AU Summit. Ambassador Sanders congratulated Annabi for agreeing on the HSP provisions with the AU, something Annabi acknowledged had required three re-openings of the document since December 4 on account of in-fighting between Konare and AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) Ambassador Said Djinnit and between Djinnit and his staff. Annabi confirmed that the HSP had been transmitted January 25 to President Bashir via twin letters from the SYG and Konare, and Annabi asserted that Bashir's reaction would constitute the first "reality check" of the tripartite mechanism for HSP implementation. Annabi was concerned by Bashir's recent backtracking in a phone call to the SYG, in which he insisted on maintaining an exclusively African character to any international presence in Darfur, a position Annabi said Konare shared. Annabi hoped that the January 29 meeting between the SYG and Bashir would clarify this issue.

[1](#)3. (C) Annabi described the "conditionality" which the AU saw as inherent in deployment of the HSP, in particular the addition of two new battalions, which presents a logistical challenge for AMIS and its partners as far as construction of accommodations and provision of water. Annabi asserted that conclusion of the outstanding 607 Agreement could help in this regard. DPKO also pointed out the need to restructure from eight to three sectors. Given these constraints, Annabi

averred it would be "nothing short of a miracle" if the HSP were to fully deploy within four to six months, despite this deployment's being an "absolute priority" for the UN. Ambassador Sanders responded that it was important to get the deployment started quickly, which would have the additional benefit of proving Bashir's acceptance of the force. Annabi went on to say that lack of viable troop contributors presented another obstacle, and he was receptive to Ambassador Sanders' assurances of U.S. assistance in identifying and encouraging troop contributors to commit to the operation.

¶4. (C) Regarding the draft hybrid force proposals (ref C), Annabi said that the UN team negotiating the HSP had traveled from Khartoum to Addis Ababa to negotiate with the AU the terms of the hybrid operation, which Annabi hoped could be finalized by January 26. Annabi reported that the AU had agreed to forgo another Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), which it had originally insisted upon after disputing the UN's force size projections in its June 2006 JAM Report. Still, the final draft of the hybrid framework had to be submitted to the AU PSC before it could be adopted, and DPKO was not optimistic that this adoption would occur at the AU Summit. Annabi identified outstanding issues in these negotiations as disagreement over how to appoint force commanders and deputy force commanders (Konare refused to accept a UN-proposed "mirror situation" by which the AU could propose a candidate for force commander if the UN could propose its own for deputy force commander); specifics of the force generation process (given Konare's insistence that troops be African at all costs); and creation of a strong planning capacity.

¶5. (C) Annabi was clear that Djinnit, after numerous phone conversations, proved to be flexible on these points and willing to negotiate. The problem, according to Annabi, was

USUN NEW Y 00000063 002 OF 002

Konare's intransigence, and he recommended strong pressure be exerted on Konare to more openly entertain the UN's proposals. Ambassador Sanders noted that Assistant Secretary Frazer would be present in Addis Ababa for the Summit, and Annabi expressed hope that she would have an opportunity to weigh in with Konare then.

¶6. (C) DPKO confirmed that it was receptive to proposals for reallocation of existing peacekeeping resources in planning for the hybrid operation, as well as for eventual operations in Somalia and Chad/Central African Republic, mentioning the possibility of using air assets from the DRC as an example. Annabi warned that any such shift would require concurrence of troop contributors and would assume that existing operations were downsizing, noting that this was not always the case. Finally, he cautioned that such a reallocation carried no guarantees of logistics capabilities from one operation to the next.

¶7. (C) COMMENT. Annabi did not reject the idea of deploying an advance component of the HSP, but he clearly needs TCC commitments before the idea can be seriously explored. DPKO is frustrated by its dealings with the AU on provisions of the HSP and the hybrid operation. Engagement by A/S Frazer with Konare at the AU Summit could be critical in reversing this trend and thereby expediting the deployment process, as could similar such engagement by our Embassy to the AU. END COMMENT.
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